What Are Fundamental Laws of Nature
A popular answer concerns being a law on deductive systems. The idea dates back to Mill (1843, 384), but has been defended in one form or another by Ramsey (1978 [f.p. 1928]), Lewis (1973, 1983, 1986, 1994), Earman (1984) and Loewer (1996). Deductive systems are individualized by their axioms. The logical consequence of axioms are theorems. Some true deductive systems will be stronger than others; Some will be simpler than others. These two virtues, strength and simplicity, compete. (It is easy to make a system stronger by sacrificing simplicity: include all truths as axioms. It is easy to simplify a system by sacrificing power: it is enough to have the axiom that 2 + 2 = 4.) According to Lewis (1973, 73), the laws of nature belong to all true deductive systems with a better combination of simplicity and strength. For example, the idea that it is a law that all uranium balls are less than a mile in diameter is because it is probably one of the best deductive systems; Quantum theory is an excellent theory of our universe and could be among the best systems, and it is plausible to think that quantum theory plus truths describing the nature of uranium would logically mean that there are no uranium balls of this size (Loewer 1996, 112). It is doubtful that the generalization that all golden balls are less than a mile in diameter would be among the best systems. It could be added as an axiom to any system, but it would bring little or nothing of interest in terms of strength and it would sacrifice something in terms of simplicity.
(Lewis subsequently made significant revisions to his narrative to solve problems of physical probability (Lewis 1986, 1994). It turned out that the nature of non-potential frictional forces is associated with gradients of external potential forces or, equivalently, with the difference of forces acting on the elements of the body. Thus, the evolution of matter is determined according to the principle of symmetry dualism and occurs when it moves in an inhomogeneous space. According to regulators, there is simply no problem of free will. We make decisions – some trivial, like buying a newspaper; Others, more substantial, such as buying a house, marriage, university, etc. – but these decisions are not imposed on us by the laws of nature. In fact, it`s the other way around. Natural laws are (a subclass of) true descriptions of the world. Whatever happens in the world, there are real descriptions of these events. It is true that you cannot “violate” a natural law, but it is not because the laws of nature “compelle” you to behave in a certain way.
On the contrary, whatever you do, there is a true description of what you have done. You certainly cannot choose the laws that describe the charge of an electron, or the properties of hydrogen and oxygen that explain their combination with water. But you can choose many other laws. How do you do that? Simply by doing what you actually do. The basic concepts and phenomena of “cause and effect” are often simple, but they usually manifest themselves in many different forms and are mutually coupled or interdependent. We often have to make various simplifications and idealizations in order to isolate phenomena and then understand and analyze them. Real properties and processes are often coupled and we usually need to idealize and decouple them in order to focus on a topic and better understand and explain it. For example, any thermal process is coupled with mechanical expansion and vice versa, and we can decouple them, such as idealizing an isochoric process with heat transfer only, or an isentropic process without heat transfer, without thermal radiation, etc.
We can idealize systems, such as perfect gases or incompressible liquids, etc., or limits, such as fluted, adiabatic, etc., or processes, such as frictionless or non-dissipative, quasi-equilibrium or reversible, etc. The focus here is on thermomechanical interactions where energy conservation has been historically “blocked” and restored (The 1st Law of Thermodynamics), but it could easily be extended to other interactions with electromagnetic, electrochemical or nuclear processes. We will idealize and define (in logical order) the main concepts and associated nomenclature used in this article as follows: There is no need to revise the statement that no generalization considered random can be confirmed. In the case of the third son, one would know that the generalization, even if it were true, would not be a law. The discussion continues. Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter proposed an alternative link between the claim and the laws on which certain counterfactual truths must be based: The observation of As who are F-and-B confirms that all non-F-A are B only if the Aces would still have been both A and B if they had not been F. (This proposition is criticized by Elliott Sober 1988, 97-98.) Lange (2000, 111-142) pursues a different strategy. He attempts to further refine the relevant notion of confirmation by characterizing what he considers an intuitive notion of inductive confirmation, and then argues that only generalizations that are not assumed to be legal can be confirmed by induction (in his sense). If scientific laws are imprecise, then there must be – presumably – other laws (statements, statements, sentences, principles) that are undoubtedly more complex, that are accurate, that are not an approximation of the truth, but that are literally true.
Dretske`s response to this quote was to conclude that the laws of nature are not universally quantified conditions; that these are not mere generalizations. Instead, it was thought that laws must be another kind of thing: a relation between universals, physically necessary generalizations, or a true axiom or theorem of an ideal system, or even a metaphysically necessary generalization. Another approach needs to be considered, maybe, just maybe, the laws of nature are generalizations and are simply not very explanatory. It is an approach that identifies what type of entity is a law of nature. Curiosity goes even further. Since what it means to be physically impossible is logically incompatible with a law of nature, then any false existential statement such as “A certain S is P” or “There is an S which is a P” would prove not only false, but physically impossible. The idea of the existence of fundamental laws of physics is based on the principles of causality. Nevertheless, this principle comes up against microworld physics problems (Tan, 2020). The nature of these problems is mainly related to Geizenberg`s uncertainty principle, according to which it is impossible to accurately determine the states of microparticles. Therefore, in the microcosm, the present is probabilistically related to the past (Geizenberg, 1968, 1989; Werner & Farrelly, 2019; Shirazi, 2020). This violates the principle of causality, without which it is impossible to construct an evolutionary image of the world.